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3Mission Statement
The threats of bio-terrorism and newly emerging infectious diseases pose serious challenges to 
the national security infrastructure. Rapid detection and diagnosis of infectious disease in 
human populations, as well as characterizing pathogen biology, are critical for reducing the 
morbidity and mortality associated with such threats. One of the key challenges in managing an 
infectious disease outbreak, whether through natural causes or acts of overt terrorism, is 
detection early enough to initiate effective countermeasures. Much recent attention has been 
directed towards the utility of biomarkers or molecular signatures that result from the 
interaction of the pathogen with the host for improving our ability to diagnose and mitigate the 
impact of a developing infection during the time window when effective countermeasures can 
be instituted.  Host responses may provide early signals in blood even from localized 
infections.  Multiple innate and adaptive immune molecules, in combination with other 
biochemical markers, may provide disease-specific information and new targets for 
countermeasures. The presence of pathogen specific markers and an understanding of the 
molecular capabilities and adaptations of the pathogen when it interacts with its host may 
likewise assist in early detection and provide opportunities for targeting countermeasures.  An 
important question that needs to be addressed is whether these molecular-based approaches 
will prove useful for early diagnosis, complement current methods of direct agent detection, 
and aid development and use of countermeasures. 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) will host a workshop to explore the utility 
of host- and pathogen-based molecular diagnostics, prioritize key research issues, and 
determine the critical steps needed to transition host-pathogen research to tools that can be 
applied towards a more effective national bio-defense strategy. The workshop will bring 
together leading researchers/scientists in the area of host-pathogen interactions as well as 
policy makers from federal agencies.  The main objectives of the workshop are:
• to assess the current national needs, capabilities, near-term technologies, and future 
challenges in applying various diagnostics tools to public health and bio-defense
• to evaluate the utility and feasibility of host-response and pathogen biomarker profiling 
in the diagnosis and management of infectious diseases
• to create a comprehensive developmental strategy from proof-of-concept, through 
validation, to deployment of  appropriate advanced technology for the clinical/public 
health and bio-defense environments
The workshop will be a 2-day event (to be held at Livermore, CA) scheduled for September 13 
and 14, 2006.  An additional day (September 15) will be reserved for laboratory tours and site 
visits.  
LLNL has a long history of successfully developing and deploying technologies and systems 
for rapid detection and identification of biological pathogens in support of national security.  
Additionally, LLNL has unique resources such as the High Performance Computing Center 
(HPCC), Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (CAMS), Livermore Micro-Array Center 
(LMAC), National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) and a range of other 
infra-structure capabilities to support development, testing and evaluation of 
technologies/systems for bio-defense applications.  LLNL is committed to researching and 
continuing to develop the next-generation tools for diagnosis and mitigation of the risk from 
both emerging infectious diseases and threats from bioterrorism.
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7:30 – 8:15 Continental Breakfast                                                   ALL
SESSION 1 : ROLE OF HOST-PATHOGEN SCIENCE IN PUBLIC HEALTH & BIO-
DEFENSE
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9:00  - 9:30 The Public Health Response to Bioterrorism: Role of
Host-Pathogen Science     Stephen Morse, CDC
9:30 – 10:00 Title - TBD       Carol Linden, HHS
10:00 – 10:20 Coffee Break                                                  ALL 
SESSION 2 : MECHANISMS OF HOST RESPONSE 
Chair : Peter Jahrling, HHS
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10:50  - 11:20                    Transcriptional Control of the Host Response
 to Pathogens Richard Jenner, 
MIT
11:20  - 11:50  Host Innate Immune Recognition of  
  B. anthracis   Molly Hughes,  UVA
11:50  - 12:20   Innate immune and necrotic pathways mediated by the 
NBD-LRR family of mammalian proteins    John Lich, UNC
12:20 – 1:15 Lunch                                                                      ALL
1:15 – 1:45                      Chemokine Receptor CCR5 Mediates Resistance to 
West Nile Virus Infection in Mouse and Man  Jean Lim, NIH
1:45 – 2:15   Francisella tularensis:  Evading and Provoking 
  Innate Immunity  Martha Furie, Stony Brook Univ.
2:15  - 4:00 Panel Discusison                               ALL
4:00 – 6:00 Poster Session                                                             ALL
56:00 Dinner                                                                     ALL
Thursday, September 14, 2006
7:00 – 8:00 Continental Breakfast                                                   ALL
SESSION 3 : MECHANISMS OF  PATHOGEN VIRULENCE AND HOST IMMUNE 
EVASION
Chair : Garry Adams, Texas A&M Univ.
8:00 – 8:30  Pathomics Discovery Platform: Brucella-
Salmonella:Host Transcriptomics, Proteomics &                          
Bioinformatics Garry Adams, Texas A&M Univ.
8:30  - 9:00 Alphavirus encephalitis: Determinants 
of outcome     Diane Griffin, JHU
 
9:00  - 9:30 Innate immunity against Francisella tularensis is
dependent on the ASC/caspase-1 axis   Denise Monack, Stanford
9:30  - 10:00  Predictive features of the genome-wide host 
response to infectious diseases David Relman, Stanford
10:00 – 10:20 Coffee Break                                                               ALL
10:20 – 10:50                Whole-Genome comparison approaches to the
study of virulence  Emilio Garcia, LLNL
10:50 – 11:10                   Beyond Pathogen Identification: Informatics 
support for characterization of virulence, 
antibiotic-resistance, host-pathogen interactions, 
  and evidence of genetic engineering    Tom Slezak, LLNL
11:10  - 12:30 Panel Discussion                                                           ALL
12:30 – 1:30 Lunch                           ALL
SESSION 4 : APPLICATIONS TO BIO-DEFENSE (DETECTION, DIAGNOSIS, 
MITIGATION) 
Chair : Fred Murphy, UTMB
1:30  - 2:00 Etiologic vs. Non-etiologic (Syndromic) Diagnosis: Fitting
into Public Health and Biodefense Systems   Fred Murphy, UTMB
2:00 – 2:30 Genome-Wide Survey of Host Responses: Use of Computational 
Analysis to Classify Exposures and Extract Signatures of 
Unconventional Versus Common Viral Exposures  Marti Jett, WRAIR
62:30 – 3:00 Breath as a Diagnostic Joany Jackman, JHU-APL
3:00 – 3:30 LLNL Roadmap for Bio-Defense Bill Colston, LLNL
3:30  - 5:00 Panel Discussion                                                            ALL          
5:00 – 5:15 Wrap-up/Summary  Ray Juzaitis, LLNL
5:15 Adjourn                                                                   ALL
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Keynote Lecture
Michael G. Kurilla, Office of Bio-Defense, DMID, NIAID, NIH, DHHS,
Bethesda, MD 20892
Abstract
Traditional antimicrobial towards infectious diseases have focused on interference with the 
ability of the pathogenic agent to replicate within the host. This infection control approach 
relies on identification of the critical gene functions essential for growth of the organism. 
These obvious ‘targets’ naturally emerged from laboratory investigations of these agents. With 
the advent of genomic sequences as well as resulting transcriptional and proteomic profiling 
particularly within the context of an animal model, infectious disease is rapidly progressing 
from an ‘infection control’ approach to a ‘disease modifying’ model. With this focus, non-
essential genes of the infectious agent may also become potential targets as well as host based 
targets that modulate pathogenesis while allowing the immune system to function in its normal 
role of pathogen clearance through a combination of the both the innate and adaptive immune 
systems. An overview of various research programs exploring potential broad spectrum 
interventions based on these concepts as well as broad spectrum platforms that should expedite 
commercial exploitation of these biomedical products will be discussed.
8The Public Health Response to Bioterrorism: Role of Host-Pathogen Science
Stephen A. Morse, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
A number of events over the last decade have served to focus attention on the threat of 
terrorism and the use of biological agents against military and civilian populations for the 
purpose of causing illness or death. Over 1400 species of infectious organisms have been 
recognized as human pathogens; only a few pose serious problems or are capable of affecting 
humans on a large scale.  Various criteria have been used to identify and prioritize these 
pathogens for public health preparedness activities. It is possible to introduce biological agents 
into civilian populations by several means, e.g., aerosol, contaminated food, water, or medical 
products, or by releasing infected arthropod vectors. A covert release of a biological agent 
would likely go unnoticed for some time, with those exposed leaving the area long before the 
act of terrorism becomes evident.  Due to an incubation period, the first signs that a biological 
agent has been released may not become apparent until days or weeks later, when individuals 
become ill and seek medical care.  The “responders” to such an event will likely be the astute 
clinician, laboratory or public health worker who recognizes the index case or identifies the 
responsible agent. 
Public health emphasizes the prevention of disease and the health needs of the population as a 
whole. A comprehensive public health response to the deliberate release of a biological agent 
(whether known or unknown at the time) will involve an epidemiologic investigation, medical 
treatment and prophylaxis for affected persons. An effective public health response would have 
to be rapid.  The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) was created to facilitate the rapid 
identification of threat agents. It has a dual function in that it has the ability to detect and 
respond to agents released by bioterrorists as well as those that occur naturally. The LRN 
consists of sentinel and reference laboratories.  Sentinel laboratories are for the most part, 
hospital and other community laboratories, which are located at the many widely dispersed 
hospitals where patients would seek care in the aftermath of a covert release.  Reference 
laboratories are primarily state and local public health laboratories with BSL-3 laboratories 
where agents and powders can be safely handled.  The reference laboratories use standard 
protocols and reagents for the identification and confirmation of threat agents such that results 
are public-health-actionable. BioWatch is a DHS environmental monitoring program, which 
uses many of the LRN laboratories to process air samples collected on filters.  Positive results 
may indicate the aerosol release of an agent and possible exposure. A public health response 
could potentially be initiated earlier if exposed individuals could be identified before they 
became symptomatic. Unfortunately, such a test would be difficult to develop, as there are 
numerous factors that influence both the susceptibility and the response of the host to a given 
pathogen.  Some of these factors are genetic, but others are age, pregnancy, medication, stress, 
behavioral, and the presence of another disease. 
On the population level, a highly sensitive test would be impractical as there would be an 
unacceptable level of positive results due to other conditions.  However, a highly specific test 
could give public-health-actionable results, but would be more expensive due to the number of 
host factors being measured.  How such a test was used would have to be carefully considered, 
as population-based testing may not be cost-effective.
9Plenary Talk for Host Mechanisms Session
Peter Jahrling, NIAID/NIH Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland
Smallpox (variola) virus poses a significant threat as an agent of bioterrorism.  To 
mitigate this risk, antiviral drugs and an improved vaccine are urgently needed. Satisfactory 
demonstration of protective efficacy against authentic variola will require development of an 
animal model in which variola produces a disease course with features consistent with human 
smallpox. Towards this end, cynomolgus macaques were exposed to several variola strains via 
aerosol and/or intravenous routes. Two strains, Harper and India 7124, produced uniform acute 
lethality when inoculated intravenously in high doses (109 PFU). Lower doses resulted in less 
fulminant, systemic disease and lower mortality. Animals that died had profound leukocytosis, 
thrombocytopenia, and elevated serum creatinine levels. Following inoculation, variola was 
disseminated via a monocytic cell-associated viremia.  Distribution of viral antigens by 
immunohistochemistry correlated with the presence of replicating viral particles demonstrated 
by electron microscopy and with pathology in the lymphoid tissues, skin, oral mucosa, 
gastrointestinal tract, reproductive system, and liver, resembling that seen in human smallpox. 
High viral burdens in target tissues were associated with organ dysfunction and multi-system 
failure.  Evidence of coagulation cascade activation (D-dimers) corroborated histologic 
evidence of hemorrhagic diathesis.  Depletion of T-cell dependent areas of lymphoid tissues 
occurred, probably as a consequence of bystander apoptotic mechanisms initiated by infected 
macrophages.  Elaboration of cytokines including IL-6,  and interferon-γ contribute to a 
cytokine storm formerly known as “toxemia.”  A more precise understanding of disease 
pathogenesis should provide targets for therapeutic intervention, to be used alone or in 
combination with inhibitors of variola virus replication.  
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Transcriptional Control of the Host Response to Pathogens
Richard G. Jenner, Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, Cambridge, MA 
and Division of Infection and Immunity, University College London, London, UK.
We have collated and compared published transcriptional profiling data involving a broad 
range of host cell types and pathogen species.  We found that different host cells respond to 
pathogens with a broadly similar expression program that we have termed the common host 
response.  This organized set of gene expression changes is observed in macrophages, dendritic 
cells, peripheral blood mononuclear cells and epithelial cells after treatment with a broad 
spectrum of bacteria, fungi and viruses. Components of this response may therefore be of use 
in defining a transcriptional signature of infection.
The common host response likely represents the concerted action of a number of transcription 
factors acting in a regulatory network.  We have begun to map this transcriptional regulatory 
network in macrophages by using genome-scale location analysis (ChIP-chip) to discover the 
set of genes bound by NF- B, both before and after treatment with lipopolysaccharide (LPS).  
These experiments identified 348 genes bound by NF- B, 90% of which were not previously 
known target genes and many of which form part of the common host response.  Our work 
reveals how the different NF- B family members coordinate their activity and, together with 
gene expression data, allow us to begin reconstructing the transcriptional regulatory networks 
that underlie the host response to infection.
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Host Innate Immune Recognition of B. anthracis
Molly A. Hughes1, Lisa Lowchyj-Waggoner1, Candace S. Green1, Vanessa K. Grippe2, Gloria 
M. Lee2, Tod J. Merkel2
1Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of Internal Medicine, University of Virginia 
Health Sciences System, Charlottesville, Virginia
2 Laboratory of Respiratory and Special Pathogens, Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research, Food and Drug Administration, Bethesda, Maryland
Bacillus anthracis is a spore-forming, Gram-positive organism that is the causative agent of 
anthrax.  Innate immune recognition of B. anthracis by the host likely plays a key protective 
role following infection.  In our studies, we have examined the host macrophage cytokine 
response to B. anthracis spores and bacilli.   Under conditions in which Sterne strain spores do 
or do not germinate, we have found that spores do not elicit a tumor necrosis factor-alpha 
(TNF- ) response from murine bone marrow-derived macrophages (BMDMs) whereas bacilli 
elicit a TNF- response comparable to that of the positive control.  We have evaluated the 
cytokine response of BMDMs exposed to non-toxigenic mutants of B. anthracis Sterne strain 
to better understand the role of lethal toxin and/or edema toxin in the host inflammatory 
response. Further, we have evaluated the role of Toll-like receptor (TLR) recognition of B. 
anthracis heat-killed bacilli.  Specifically, we have examined in vitro and in vivo the role of 
TLR2, TLR4, and the TLR adaptor signaling protein MyD88 in the response to B. anthracis.  
Heat-killed B. anthracis (HKBa) stimulates TLR2, but not TLR4, signaling in human
embryonic kidney 293 cells and stimulates TNF- production in C3H/HeN, C3H/HeJ, and 
C57BL/6J BMDMs.  The ability of HKBa to induce a TNF- response is preserved in TLR2-/-
but not in MyD88-/- BMDMs.  In vivo studies revealed that TLR2-/- mice and TLR4-deficient 
mice are resistant to challenge with aerosolized Sterne strain spores but MyD88-/- mice are as 
susceptible as A/J mice.  We conclude that, although recognition of B. anthracis bacilli occurs 
via TLR2, additional MyD88-dependent pathways contribute to the host innate immune 
response to anthrax infection.   Ongoing studies are focused on further characterizing the 
MyD88-dependent pathways involved in the host response to B. anthracis
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Innate Immune and Necrotic Pathways Mediated By The NBD-LRR Family 
of Mammalian Proteins
Lich JD, Williams KL, Willingham S, Bergstrahl DT, O’Connor W,  and Ting J  Lineberger 
Comprehensive Cancer Center and the Department of Microbiology and Immunology, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599
We first described a large family of mammalian proteins that share structural homology with 
plant pathogen resistance proteins.  These proteins harbor N-terminal coiled-coil domains 
(CARD/Pyrin/BIR), central nucleotide binding domains (NBD), and C-terminal leucine rich 
repeats (LRR).  Based on this domain architecture, we named these proteins the 
CATERPILLER or CLR family for CARD, Transcription Enhancer, R (purine)-binding, Pyrin, 
Lots of Leucine Repeats.  Subsequently, this family of proteins has been designated NBD-LRR 
or NLR.  This presentation will describe two NLR proteins that harbor N-terminal pyrin 
domains and play novel roles in innate immune signaling and cell death.
The first member, Monarch-1, is expressed exclusively in myeloid cells and is an inhibitor of 
TLR and CD40 signaling. Its mRNA and protein levels are reduced by TLR agonists including 
bacteria.  Functionally, Monarch-1 prevents the hyperphosphorylation of IRAK-1. This leads 
to the attenuation of TLR-mediated activation of NF-kB and cytokine production, as shown by 
the analysis of siRNA targeted cells. In addition, Monarch-1 also interferes with NIK-
dependent activation of non-canonical NF-kB downstream of CD40.  In Monarch-1 expressing 
monocytes, NF-kB2/p100 is not processed to its active form, p52. This is due to the association 
of Monarch-1 with NIK, which results in rapid proteasome-mediated degradation of the kinase.
The second member, CIAS1/cryopyrin/NALP3, is also predominantly expressed in myeloid cells. 
Mutations in this gene are linked to several autoinflammatory syndromes. Patients with defects in 
this gene exhibit enhanced inflammation characterized by increased IL-1 production. We analyzed 
three distinct CIAS1 disease-associated variants as well as monocytic cells from patients harboring 
these mutations. The disease-associated forms of CIAS1 cause enhanced cell death. This requires 
ASC (Apoptotic speck-containing protein with a CARD) but surprisingly, not IL-1.  Thus cell 
death was not secondary to hyper-IL-1 synthesis. This form of cell death and its relationship to 
inflammation will be discussed.
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Chemokine Receptor CCR5 Mediates Resistance to West Nile Virus Infection 
in Mouse and Man
Jean K. Lim1, William G. Glass2, David H. McDermott1, Alexander Pletnev1, Rushina Cholera1, 
Ji-liang Gao1, Sudkamon Lekhong3, Shuk Fong Yu3, William A. Frank4, John Pape5, Ronald C. 
Cheshier3, and Philip M. Murphy1.
1National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, 
MD. 20892; 2Centocor Global R&D, Infectious Diseases, Radnor, PA, 19087; 3Bureau of State 
Laboratory Services and 4Bureau of Epidemiology and Disease Control Services, Arizona 
Department of Health Services, Phoenix, AZ 85007; 5Colorado Department of Public Health & 
Environment, Denver, CO 80246.
West Nile Virus (WNV) is a re-emerging pathogen and a well-known agent of fatal encephalitis 
in several species, including man, however immunopathogenic mechanisms are poorly 
understood. Here, in a mouse model of WNV infection we observed upregulation of the 
chemokine receptor CCR5 and its ligand CCL5 in brain. Infection of CCR5-/- mice was rapidly 
and uniformly fatal, whereas the majority of CCR5+/+ mice survived.  In the brain, CCR5-/-
mice had increased viral burden and markedly reduced numbers of NK1.1+ cells, macrophages, 
and CD4+ and CD8+ T cells as compared to WNV-infected CCR5+/+ control mice, suggesting a 
protective role of the receptor mediated at the level of leukocyte trafficking to brain.  Consistent 
with this, adoptive transfer of splenocytes from WNV-infected CCR5+/+ mice into infected 
CCR5-/- mice increased leukocyte accumulation in the CNS compared to transfer of splenocytes 
from infected CCR5-/- mice into infected CCR5-/- mice and resulted in an overall increase in 
survival, returning the mortality rate to  the level observed in CCR5+/+ control mice.  Consistent 
with the mouse model, homozygosity for CCR5 32, a non-functional allele of human CCR5,
was ~5-fold higher in both of two cohorts of symptomatic WNV-seropositive individuals in the 
US compared to a control population of healthy Caucasian random blood donors, and was 
associated with increased mortality. Collectively, these data suggest that CCR5 mediates 
resistance to fatal WNV infection in mouse and man by coordinating leukocyte recruitment to 
the infected brain and that CCR5 32 homozygosity is a genetic risk factor for symptomatic 
WNV infection in man, the first identified for this disease. The results suggest that 
pharmacologic blockade of CCR5 may increase susceptibility to disease in WNV infected 
individuals.  
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Francisella tularensis:  Evading and Provoking Innate Immunity
Martha B. Furie, Center for Infectious Diseases, Stony Brook University, 
Stony Brook, NY
Circulating leukocytes respond to infections in tissues by migrating across the endothelial 
lining of blood vessels and accumulating in the affected area.  Endothelial cells play a key role 
in this inflammatory process through upregulation of adhesion molecules that bind to 
leukocytes and secretion of chemokines that guide their movement out of the vessels.  We 
found that the live vaccine strain (LVS) of Francisella tularensis stimulated such pro-
inflammatory changes in cultured human umbilical vein endothelial cells (HUVEC), but it did 
so in a unique manner.  The living bacterium induced only a limited subset of changes, 
whereas killed F. tularensis LVS elicited a wider, more typical array of alterations.  We 
speculate that limited activation of endothelium in response to living F. tularensis may 
facilitate establishment of an initial infection.  The fuller activation that is induced by dead 
organisms may be required subsequently for recruitment of macrophages, which the bacterium 
invades and co-opts as a protected niche for replication.  
Many Gram-negative bacteria activate endothelium via their lipopolysaccharide (LPS), but the 
structure of F. tularensis LPS is atypical.  Indeed, we observed that purified LPS from both the 
LVS and fully virulent strains of F. tularensis did not activate endothelial cells, even at very 
high concentrations.  We further noted that intact F. tularensis LVS elicited secretion of pro-
inflammatory cytokines from human, but not murine, macrophages.  Although purified LPS 
from F. tularensis stimulated human macrophages to a limited extent, much greater amounts 
were required compared to LPS from E. coli.
We therefore began to search for alternative pro-inflammatory components of F. tularensis.  A 
prime candidate was LpnA, a 17-kDa outer surface lipoprotein that is prominently expressed.  
The gene encoding LpnA in the LVS was ablated, and the behavior of the resulting LpnA-
deficient strain was compared to that of the wild-type organism.  When inoculated into mice, 
the deficient strain was as virulent as the wild-type strain.  Moreover, the deficient strain 
completely protected mice against subsequent challenge with a lethal dose of the LVS.  When 
incubated with HUVEC or human macrophages, the LpnA-deficient and wild-type strains 
induced secretion of pro-inflammatory cytokines to similar degrees.  However, in preliminary 
experiments, recombinant LpnA stimulated both endothelial cells and macrophages.  Perhaps, 
then, other lipoproteins compensate for the absence of LpnA in the mutant strain. 
To identify additional pro-inflammatory factors of F. tularensis, fractionation of material 
released from killed bacteria was performed by FPLC.  Three fractions of approximately 60, 
30, and 6 kDa stimulated expression of the adhesion molecule E-selectin by HUVEC.  A 
prominent component in the 60-kDa fraction was a putative heat-shock protein, GroEL.  
GroEL was removed by immunoprecipitation from the material released by killed F. 
tularensis.  The depleted samples activated HUVEC to the same degree as did untreated 
samples but lost all ability to stimulate human macrophages.  GroEL may therefore interact 
specifically with macrophages to provoke inflammation in hosts infected with F. tularensis.
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Pathomics Discovery Platform: Brucella-Salmonella:Host Transcriptomics, 
Proteomics & Bioinformatics
L. Garry Adams, DVM, PhD, DAVCP, Associate Dean for Research, College of 
Veterinary Medicine, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4461
Understanding the pathogenesis and host-pathogen infection-response pathways is central to 
the ability to develop improved prevention and intervention strategies as well as medical 
countermeasures to biological warfare agents.  Development of broad based therapeutics will 
benefit from the identification of common pathways induced in the host by multiple select 
agents rather than a single agent.  The advent of broad scale global technologies that measure 
either the levels of mRNA expression or protein abundance of all the gene products 
simultaneously enables a systems level approach to the interpretation of the data.  The 
subsequent application of powerful bioinformatics tools to the integration and interpretation of 
all the datasets on a global level provides a model of all the pathways that are responding to the 
infection by the select agents.  
The Pathomics Discovery Platform combines host and pathogen gene microarrays and 
proteomics capabilities to identify and better understand common host pathways of the 
intracellular bacterial, select agent pathogens infection, Brucella spp. and Salmonella 
typhimurium.  Initially, we focused on the in vitro macrophage cell culture infection model to 
optimize analytical procedures.  These experiments provide data for the creation of a host 
response model that are subsequently tested in in vivo bovine models.  Bovine macrophages 
were infected with Brucella spp. or Salmonella and at a variety of time points after the 
infection, infected macrophages were harvested, lysed and mRNAs were extracted for 
microarray experiments using the custom spotted arrays.  Extracted proteins are being 
processed to peptides and analyzed for proteomic analyses.  Bioinformatics approaches are 
used to integrate these data and extract the host response pathways.  Ultimately, we will 
construct a conceptual in silico host response model that describes the common pathways 
involved in Brucella-Salmonella intracellular bacterial infection. 
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Alphavirus Encephalitis: Determinants of Outcome
Diane E. Griffin MD PhD
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD
Alphaviruses are mosquito-borne enveloped, plus-strand RNA viruses that cycle in nature 
between mosquitoes and birds or mammals and can cause disease in humans or equines.  
Human disease is manifest as fever, rash, arthritis or encephalomyelitis.  We have studied 
Sindbis virus, the alphavirus type species, in mice as an example of virus-induced 
encephalomyelitis.  The virus infects neurons preferentially and the outcome is dependent on 
both host and viral factors. Young mice are more susceptible to fatal encephalitis than mature 
mice and this is independent of the adaptive immune response.  Virus replicates more 
efficiently and causes death in immature neurons, but mature neurons can survive infection.  
This may be related to the increased expression of interferon pathway genes as neurons mature.  
In mature neurons that survive infection, the adaptive immune response, particularly antiviral 
antibody and interferon-g produced by T cells, can control virus replication in a noncytolytic 
fashion.  Noncytolytic mechanisms of viral clearance are important for recovery because 
cytotoxic elimination of the infected neuron would result in permanent neurologic damage.  
Antiviral antibody and interferon-g are the primary means of noncytolytic clearance, but 
response is neuron type-specific.  Virulent viruses can overcome the defense mechanisms of 
mature neurons and cause neuronal death.  Virulence is primarily determined by amino acid 
changes in the glycoproteins and 5’ NTR of the virus.
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Innate Immunity Against Francisella tularensis is Dependent 
on the ASC/caspase-1 axis
Sanjeev Mariathasan1*, David S. Weiss2*, Vishva M. Dixit1, and Denise M. Monack2
1Molecular Oncology Department, Genentech Inc, 1 DNA Way, South San Francisco, CA 
94080  2Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Stanford University School of 
Medicine, Stanford, CA 94305.
Francisella tularensis is a highly infectious gram-negative coccobacillus that causes the 
zoonosis tularemia.  This bacterial pathogen causes a fulminating disease in humans after 
exposure to as few as 10 cells, and has raised considerable concern as a potential bioterrorist
agent.  Many of the mechanisms by which the innate immune system fights Francisella are 
unknown, but it is clear that Francisella compromises this host response by replicating within 
macrophages.  Here we show that in response to Francisella infection, activated macrophages 
undergo caspase-1-dependent death and concurrently release the pro-inflammatory cytokines 
interleukin-1 and interleukin-18.  Activation of caspase-1 and induction of macrophage cell 
death required the death-fold containing, caspase-1 adapter, ASC.  F. tularensis-infected 
caspase-1- and ASC-deficient mice showed markedly increased bacterial burdens and mortality 
as compared to wild-type mice, demonstrating a key role for caspase-1 and ASC in innate 
defense against infection by this microorganism.  Francisella mutant strains that do not 
localize to the cytosol did not activate caspase-1 or induce host cell death, suggesting that 
ASC/caspase-1 specifically responds to intracytosolic infection.  
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Predictive Features Of The Genome-Wide Host Response 
To Infectious Diseases
David A. Relman, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA 94305
Genomic tools and approaches have enabled a more detailed description of host-
microbe encounters, and shed light on fundamentally important processes, including the 
cellular responses associated with infection. Genome-wide transcript-abundance profiles, like 
other comprehensive molecular readouts of host physiological state, provide a detailed 
blueprint of the host-pathogen dialogue during microbial disease, and can reveal functional 
gene-based modules associated with mechanisms of virulence and host defense.  Studies of 
cancer based on genome-wide transcript-abundance profiles have led to novel signatures that 
predict disease outcome and serve as useful clinical classifiers. The highly dynamic and 
compartmentalized aspects of the host response to pathogens complicates efforts to identify 
predictive signatures for infectious diseases. Yet, studies of systemic infectious diseases so far 
suggest the possibility of successfully discriminating between different types (classes) of 
infection and predicting clinical outcome. In addition, host gene expression analysis could lead 
to the identification of early signatures associated with a protective immune response, both to 
natural infection and to vaccination. Early explorations in some of these areas indicate the 
potential feasibility of this approach but also point to important unmet challenges.
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Whole-Genome Comparison Approaches to the Study of Virulence
Emilio Garcia, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550
Using in-house, recently generated, whole-genome sequences of pathogens of interest and their 
near-neighbors with reduced or differential virulence, we have explored the ability to identify 
novel virulence genes or mechanisms of virulence in selected pathogens. Using this approach, 
we have looked at the role of unique regions acquired or retained during evolution of 
pathogens such as Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis and Brucella abortus. Furthermore, 
we have constructed whole genome DNA arrays that have enabled us to perform comparative, 
genome-wide expression studies among the pathogens and their less pathogenic near 
neighbors. We have identified such unique genomic regions in Y. pestis versus Y. 
pseudotuberculosis, F. tularensis Schu4 versus F. tularensis LVS, and B. abortus versus 
related Brucella species. For Y. pestis we have generated individual knockouts of each of the 
unique regions and tested them for loss of virulence in a murine model.
Differentially inactivated genes (pseudogenes) and non-expressed proteins have served to 
identify in B. abortus target candidates for rapid diagnosis, identification and potential vaccine 
development. The approaches used with these pathogens are being complemented with parallel 
studies that measure differential global gene expression patterns in the host during infection by 
fully virulent and less virulent pathogen pairs. The advantages and limitations of this approach 
will be discussed.
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Beyond Pathogen Identification: Informatics Support for Characterization 
of Virulence, Antibiotic-Resistance, Host-Pathogen Interactions, and 
Evidence of Genetic Engineering
Tom Slezak, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550
The LLNL pathogen informatics team has been supporting a wide range of diagnostic assay 
development efforts over the past 6 years. Initially, the focus was heavily slanted towards 
pathogen identification diagnostics (e.g., “What organism is this?”) The LLNL team has been 
quite successful at getting large numbers of pathogen assays validated and into daily use 
around the country in the BASIS and BioWatch programs. This work is now focusing on 
filling the remaining gaps and will be briefly summarized, along with parallel work on 
designing protein detection assays.
More recently, we have been focused to begin to answer questions about pathogen 
characterization (e.g., “What harm can this organism do? What resistance to countermeasures 
does this organism possess?”) and pathogen interactions with hosts (e.g., “What effects does 
this organism have upon the host’s functioning?”)
We will describe our recent informatics work supporting several projects that are exploring 
pathogen functions and host-pathogen interactions. We will also describe a large-scale project 
that defined nearly 900 Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) to known mechanisms involved with 
virulence and antibiotic-resistance, as well as vectors indicative of potential bacterial 
engineering. This work has led to microarray prototypes using over 390K probes that are being 
used to establish probe design rules and determine effective limits of detection on this 
platform.
Looking forward, we will summarize some of the current informatics challenges to tackling the 
problems of detecting and characterizing emerging, unknown, and engineered organisms, both 
in the environment and within hosts.
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Etiologic vs. Non-etiologic (Syndromic) Diagnosis: Fitting into Public Health 
and Biodefense Systems
Frederick A. Murphy, University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, TX 77555
Gretsky's Law (as espoused by Charlie Canter): “Skate to where the puck is going to be, not 
where it is.”
Biodefense Aphorisms: “Do not assume anything.” “Expect the unexpected.”
Many facets of the pathogenesis of the infectious diseases caused by agents that may be 
favored by terrorists, especially those involving innate and acquired host defenses, have been 
forwarded as candidate diagnostic targets for use in early warning systems and even in the 
special clinical systems needed to deal with the large numbers of patients that might need 
emergency care in a bioterrorism episode. As stated in the recent IOM Report, Globalization, 
Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences (National Academies Press, 2006) we need “a 
broader perspective on the ‘threat spectrum’”: (1) “We must recognize the limitations inherent 
in any agent-specific threat list and consider instead the intrinsic properties of pathogens and 
toxins that render them a threat and how such properties have been or could be manipulated by 
evolving technologies”; and (2) “We must adopt a broadened awareness of threats beyond the 
classical ‘select agents’ and other pathogenic organisms and toxins, so as to include, for 
example, approaches for disrupting host homeostatic and defense systems, and approaches for 
creating synthetic organisms.”
However, while delving into the pathogenetic markers of disease processes and host response 
processes associated with specific infectious agents and the diseases they cause, that is “non-
etiologic (syndromic) diagnostic approaches,” it seems important to assess just how the 
products of such research might fit into the diagnostic systems that our national and local 
institutions and agencies will be using for the foreseeable future. Can completely new 
approaches be piggy-backed upon traditional systems, which are largely based upon etiologic 
diagnosis (and associated immunologic/serologic diagnosis), in long-established laboratories? 
Or, will new laboratories, with separate personnel, be needed to carry out such non-etiologic 
(syndromic) diagnostic testing? Or, will “curb-side” — “dipstick” etiologic and/or non-
etiologic tests be put in the hands of first responders, with all professionally-based diagnostic 
approaches bypassed? Or, will we have “all-of-the-above,” and if so, who will interpret results 
in the timeframe needed to drive prevention and control actions? Is our leadership up to any 
such change?
Several perspectives are needed in trying to answer these questions:
(1) Much biodefense technology is rooted in the military / national security culture, not in 
the very different culture of public health laboratory and epidemiology institutions. 
After the initial burst of cross-talk following 9-11 and the anthrax episodes of 2001, 
these cultures seem to have resettled into their separate traditional trenches. 
Importantly, first responder and emergency services personnel seem to have received 
most of their training from the military / national security culture (often from retired 
experts serving as private consultants). Are those experts who are teaching biodefense 
knowledgeable enough of the complex issues of etiologic vs. non-etiologic (syndromic) 
diagnosis?
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(2) Of all the forms of terrorism, bioterrorism stands out as most different, most 
misunderstood by people who are experts on explosive, chemical and nuclear threats. 
For example, in a bioterrorism attack there will be no immediate warning, only the later 
appearance at emergency rooms and clinics of numbers of patients suffering common, 
perhaps unusual, perhaps not unusual, clinical signs. All this might be localized, or 
might be part of a multifocal attack. Are those experts who are teaching biodefense 
knowledgeable enough of the complex issues of etiologic vs. non-etiologic (syndromic) 
diagnosis as questions and decisions are made in emergency rooms and clinics?
(3) The “astute clinician” (medical or veterinary) and/or the “astute pathologist” will be the 
first to suspect a malicious attack, and the first to ask for the special laboratory testing 
called for at this point. The same people will likely be the first to ask for the kind of 
initial epidemiologic investigation that triggers the full public health response system. 
Will these clinicians and pathologists be willing to deal with etiologic as well as non-
etiologic (syndromic) diagnosis?
(4) Again, after the initial burst of cross-talk following 9-11 and the anthrax episodes of 
2001, public health authorities, now rather well funded, have independently developed 
comprehensive action plans that involve all levels of the public health infrastructure 
and health care systems, including pharmaceutical stockpiles, but partly because of 
separate politics, separate funding and separate cultures, additional new connections 
across agencies and institutions seem to have slowed to a trickle. Can the initial burst of 
enthusiasm for new approaches be rekindled at the interface between the public health, 
clinical medicine and counterterrorism communities of our country?
(5) Our leadership suffers from “The View from the DC Beltway,” “The View from 
Atlanta” (i.e., CDC), “The View from The California Office of Emergency Services 
(OES),” “The View from Local Emergency Services and First Responder 
Organizations,” “The View from the State Public Health Establishment,” et al. A major 
fault uncovered in bioterrorism “war games” (i.e., “table-top exercises”) in recent years 
(Topoff I and II, Dark Winter) has been that our leaders are unfamiliar with the 
character of bioterrorist attacks, do not understand available policy options and their 
consequences and likely will turn for advice to trusted associates rather than unfamiliar 
senior public health and medical leaders. Can decision-makers, via their advisors, 
fathom the complexities of etiologic vs. non-etiologic (syndromic) diagnosis?
(6) National medical research leadership, especially in regard to funding, seems on the 
horns of a dilemma—on one side noting a need for pragmatic technology development, 
and on the other side wishing to continue the tradition of scholarly investigator-initiated 
research. This has been especially clear in regard to national biocontainment facility 
needs, and specialized diagnostics and diagnostic technologies needs. Here, the 
leadership certainly understands the value and potential value of both etiologic and 
non-etiologic (syndromic) diagnostics, but funding seems quixotic. How does the new 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security fit into the overall funding base for research in 
this area?
(7) Yet again, after the initial burst of cross-talk, the special case of the threat of an 
agricultural bio-terrorism incident seems to have drifted back into the bailiwick of 
USDA and its state-based subunits. The far more advanced infrastructure and 
technologies of human public health institutions have not been well co-opted as initially 
anticipated. Can non-etiologic (syndromic) diagnosis play a role here?
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(8) In recent years nearly all emerging infectious disease episodes have involved zoonotic 
etiologic agents. Further, nearly all infectious agents listed as bioterrorism threats are 
zoonotic. Public health prevention and control strategies have largely been developed 
from experiences with vaccine-preventable childhood diseases, sexually transmitted 
diseases, etc., where traditional surveillance and case-control studies provide the base 
for intervention activities. Most public health leaders “cut-their-eye-teeth” dealing with 
such diseases. For the zoonoses, prevention and control strategies have come from a 
quite diverse and separate base. At the heart of this base have been individual scientists 
working at the interface between public health and veterinary public health, who have 
spent whole careers accumulating highly specialized knowledge and experience. These 
scientists have learned to work with experts in fields far removed from the medical 
sciences, fields as diverse as molecular virology, bacteriology and parasitology, 
immunology, pathology, ecology, animal biology, wildlife biology, mammology, 
ornithology, entomology, meteorology, climatology, geography, epidemiology, 
sociology, and economics. It would seem that these scientists are barely coping to 
advance etiologic diagnostics for most of priority zoonotic agents. It seems likely that 
non-etiologic diagnostic approaches will only come after much more pathogenetic 
research of zoonotic infections and agents in reservoir hosts and in humans.
With these perspectives in mind, one question before the workshop participants should be, 
“Will any non-etiologic (syndromic) diagnostic approach, no matter how promising, ever be 
assimilated into the largely etiologic diagnostic systems used in those institutions whose 
diagnostic findings actually drive intervention actions?” If proven non-etiologic diagnostic 
approaches are only used in isolated military or national security settings, then how will key 
specimens entering the main public health diagnostic stream of our country ever be tested 
using non-etiologic diagnostic technologies? Even at institutions such as CDC, there is some 
separation between specimens collected for biodefense vs. public health purposes. Unlike the 
situation with environmental specimens, for example the air sample specimens assayed in 
connection with the Salt Lake Winter Olympics, where there was no competing turf, there is a
long-established turf regarding ownership of diagnostic specimens from humans, and to date 
this turf seems quite conservatively organized at national, state and local levels. Is this to 
change? Is this Workshop a place to discuss such change?
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Genome-Wide Survey of Host Responses: Use of Computational Analysis 
to Classify Exposures and Extract Signatures of Unconventional 
Versus Common Viral Exposures
Rasha Hammamieh and Marti Jett
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 503 Robert Grant Ave, Silver Spring, MD 20910
Mahmoud Djavani and Maria Salvato
University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute, Baltimore, MD
Steven Eker and Patrick Lincoln
SRI International, Inc
Menlo Park, CA
Background: Exposures to many unconventional pathogenic agents result in flu-like illness 
that are initially indistinguishable from common respiratory illnesses and early diagnosis to 
distinguish among the severe vs common viral infections depends on pathogen proliferation to 
dangerous, near-untreatable levels. Assessing exposure to a pathogen, in advance of onset of 
illness or at various stages post-exposure, is invaluable among the diagnostic options.  
Lymphocytes serve as “whistle blower” indicators as they encounter pathogenic agents even 
early during the course of infection, registering the encounters in their mRNA. and developing 
patterns of expression that correspond to each specific pathogen.  Time series of gene 
expression patterns relate to the stage or severity of the infection and are unique for each 
pathogen.
Results:  We are using the host blood for determination of whole genome regulation in 
response to various viral agents to extract features and signatures that can be used for point-of-
care diagnosis of various viral infections (common respiratory, arena, flavi-, alpha- and other 
viruses). These data also have the potential to provide stage-appropriate therapeutic targets.  
These studies utilized exposure time sequences of host gene expression. Series #1 contained 
common respiratory viruses (influenza A, parainfluenza, rhinovirus, respiratory synctical 
virus).  Series #2 focused on 5 arena viruses (the highly virulent hemorrhagic virus, Lassa, and 
2 additional pairs of virulent/avirulent arena viruses).  Series #3.  includes flaviviruses (West 
Nile virus and 4 serotypes of Dengue), and Series #4, 2 alpha viruses, among which was 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE).  The “training sets” were constructed from in vitro 
exposures to purified peripheral blood leukocytes from ~6 human leukapheresis donors for 
each virus described above.  Numerous modeling / mathematical techniques were applied to 
these datasets in order to identify signature patterns indicative of each.  The “shrink/grow” 
modeling approaches were used as well as other algorithms that have shown success for 
signature extraction. For the “grow” algorithm, genes are individually selected aiming at those 
with the best discriminating power; the first of those frequently show properties unique for 
specific viral infections.   
Our first question related to the fact that, by necessity (due to the lack of human samples from 
exposures to biothreat pathogens), we were training on in vitro exposures to these many 
pathogenic agents.  Our thesis was that such an exposure would provide a biochemical 
signature, related to the mechanistic course of action of each pathogenic agent and it should be 
reflective of at least early events from in vivo exposures (to non-human primates-NHP).  
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Our first “test” data set was from host gene expression responses in peripheral blood 
(leukocytes) from NHP exposed to VEE.  This is a mosquito-borne viral disease characterized 
by fever and one or more of the following: severe headache, back pain, myalgias, prostration, 
chills, nausea, vomiting, weakness and other flu-like symptoms. The aerosol form of VEE is 
highly infectious, making VEE a potential biowarfare agent. This could be especially 
worrisome if strains are altered genetically to increase pathogenicity. If this virus was deployed 
efficiently, it could incapacitate thousands of people for a week or more and cause untold 
psychological stress as well as being physically debilitating.  Diagnosis of VEE relies on virus 
isolation from acute phase serum or from spinal fluid, or on detection of VEEV-specific IgM in 
the cerebrospinal fluid in cases of encephalitis.  We carried out 2 different approaches using 
blood from 12-25 control (unexposed) NHP along with 8 samples from VEE-exposed NHP.  
Although no signs of illness were apparent by day 3, gene expression patterns identified these 
NHP as having mild exposure to the virus.  To increase the level of confidence in the 
methodology, the NHP samples from 12 control and 5 VEE challenged NHP were blinded as 
“test” datasets.  All of the 17 samples were correctly categorized as to the nature of the
exposure.  Using both types of training/test methods, one control NHP was categorized 
correctly as a “control” but had at least some indicators of common viral exposure.  
Additional studies are underway to apply the most instructive of these algorithms to arena 
viruses (NHP exposed to Lassa virus), people exposed to dengue virus or West Nile virus or 
influenza A.  
Conclusions: Oligonucleotide (70 mer) arrays or cDNA microarray studies were effectively 
used for “training” datasets to address the following questions: 1) Are there common genes 
modulated under both NHP in vivo and human in vitro conditions in response to VEE 
exposure? 2) Does this common set of genes permit sufficient discrimination of a test data set 
based on an in vivo pathogen exposure against a database derived from in vitro exposures to 
several pathogens especially respiratory and arena viruses?  Our successes in correct 
identification of exposures in NHP to VEE provide a framework for further work in validating 
and differentiating viral exposures from other pathogenic agents using blood from in NHP or 
human exposures.  
Today’s fast growing sphere of bioinformatics involves retrieving precise information from 
massive datasets to achieve in-depth understanding of systems biology. Using our program, 
GeneCite, scientists can interconnect two input files via any of the three available Boolean 
operators at NCBI web domain. The other tool, PathwayScreen, takes a list of Gene ID 
numbers and outputs a file listing the pathways that those genes are in and a link to any 
appropriate resources, namely BioCarta.com.  These and other tools (BioSPICE.org) provide a 
systems biology approach to understanding pathogenesis through inferences of the host 
responses. 
This study is part of our larger quest to create a library of host gene expression responses that 
broadly distinguish among common and unconventional pathogenic agents, showing severity 
of responses via a molecular pathogenesis blueprint that will enable us to design novel methods 
for intervention.  New technologies for multiplexing genomic responses have decreased the 
time required for such analyses to nearly “point of care” applications. Finding a small number 
of predictor genes that can accurately classify exposures can offer new options for early 
detection upon exposure to pathogenic agents
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Breath as a Diagnostic
J Jackman and N Boggs
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel MD
Generally, detection of infection occurs when signs are observed and symptoms are reported 
by exposed people.  To effectively protect troops and civilians against attacks with biological 
weapons, a rapid method to detect infection prior to the onset of illness would be beneficial.
We have proposed to develop such a method for rapid evaluation of infection using the 
markers in breath to aid in the determination of infection. Collection of breath has several 
advantages including that it can be obtained readily from all people and sampling is non 
invasive and therefore, low risk.  There were three stages to this approach. First we wanted to 
demonstrate that biological molecules produced by the host in response to infection could be 
rapidly detected. Second, we wanted to demonstrate that these molecules could be used to 
distinguish infection in vitro and in vivo. Third we wished to show that these host response 
molecules as a group do not appear in uninfected populations. To this end we have 
demonstrated that the early responses of cells to infection vary with infectious agent. We 
showed the appearance of cytokines and other proteins in exhaled breath (EB) derived from 
pathogen exposed pigs using ELISA and mass spectrometry (MS). In these studies, their 
appearance preceded the onset of symptoms and correlated with exposure to agent. For this 
technology to be an effective diagnostic, immune markers which appear as a result of exposure 
to agents should be absent in uninfected populations.  Finally, we demonstrated that early 
immune markers which correlate with infection are not randomly detectable in the baseline 
breath samples of apparently health swine populations by MS or ELISA assays  This data 
further supports the operational concept of using EB condensates to rapidly evaluate health 
status.
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